On the possibility of stable regularities without fundamental laws

This doctoral dissertation investigates the notion of physical necessity. Specifically, it studies whether it is possible to account for non-accidental regularities without the standard assumption of a pre-existent set of governing laws. Thus, it takes side with the so called deflationist accounts of laws of nature, like the humean or the antirealist. The specific aim is to complement such accounts by providing a missing explanation of the appearance of physical necessity. In order to provide an explanation, I recur to fields that have not been appealed to so far in discussions about the metaphysics of laws. Namely, I recur to complex systems’ theory, and to the foundations of statistical mechanics. The explanation proposed is inspired by how complex systems’ theory has elucidated the way patterns emerge, and by the probabilistic explanations of the 2nd law of thermodynamics. More specifically, this thesis studies how some constraints that make no direct reference to the dynamics can be a sufficient condition for obtaining in the long run, with high probability, stable regular behavior. I hope to show how certain metaphysical accounts of laws might benefit from the insights achieved in these other fields. According to the proposal studied in this thesis, some regularities are not accidental not in virtue of an underlying physical necessity. The non-accidental character of certain regular behavior is only due to its overwhelming stability. Thus, from this point of view the goal becomes to explain the stability of temporal patterns without assuming a set of pre-existent guiding laws. It is argued that the stability can be the result of a process of convergence to simpler and stable regularities from a more complex lower level. According to this project, if successful, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) intermediate category between logical necessity and pure contingency. Similarly, there would be no need to postulate a (mysterious) set of pre-existent governing laws. Part I of the thesis motivates part II, mostly by arguing why further explanation of the notions of physical necessity and governing laws should be welcomed (chapter 1), and by studying the plausibility of a lawless fundamental level (chapters 2 and 3). Given so, part II develops the explanation of formation of simpler and stable behavior from a more complex underlying level

Stable regularities without governing laws?

Can stable regularities be explained without appealing to governing laws or any other modal notion? In this paper, I consider what I will call a 'Humean system' -- a generic dynamical system without guiding lawsd -- and assess whether it could display stable regularities. First, I present what can be interpreted as an account of the rise of stable regularities, following from Strevens (2003), which has been applied to explain the patterns of complex systems (such as those from meteorology and statistical mechanics). Second, since this account presupposes that the underlying dynamics displays deterministic chaos, I assess whether it can be adapted to cases where the underlying dynamics is not chaotic but truly random -- that is, cases where there is no dynamics guiding the time evolution of the system. If this is so, the resulting stable, apparently non-accidental regularities are the fruit of what can be called statistical necessity rather than of a primitive physical necessity

Are non-accidental regularities a cosmic coincidence? Revisiting a central threat to Humean laws

If the laws of nature are as the Humean believes, it is an unexplained cosmic coincidence that the actual Humean mosaic is as extremely regular as it is. This is a strong and well-known objection to the Humean account of laws. Yet, as reasonable as this objection may seem, it is nowadays sometimes dismissed. The reason: its unjustified implicit assignment of equiprobability to each possible Humean mosaic; that is, its assumption of the principle of indifference, which has been attacked on many grounds ever since it was first proposed. In place of equiprobability, recent formal models represent the doxastic state of total ignorance as suspension of judgment. In this paper I revisit the cosmic coincidence objection to Humean laws by assessing which doxastic state we should endorse. By focusing on specific features of our scenario I conclude that suspending judgment results in an unnecessarily weak doxastic state. First, I point out that recent literature in epistemology has provided independent justifications of the principle of indifference. Second, given that the argument is framed within a Humean metaphysics, it turns out that we are warranted to appeal to these justifications and assign a uniform and additive credence distribution among Humean mosaics. This leads us to conclude that, contrary to widespread opinion, we should not dismiss the cosmic coincidence objection to the Humean account of laws

How bad is the postulation of a low entropy initial state of the universe?

I summarize, in this informal interview, the main approaches to the ‘Past Hypothesis’, the postulation of a low-entropy initial state of the universe. I’ve chosen this as an open problem in the philosophical foundations of physics. I hope that this brief overview helps readers in gaining perspective and in appreciating the diverse range of approaches in this fascinating unresolved debate

How bad is the postulation of a low entropy initial state of the universe?

I briefly summarize, through an informal interview, the main answers given to the ‘Past Hypothesis’, the postulation of a low-entropy initial state of the universe. I have chosen this as an open problem in contemporary philosophy, specifically in the foundations of physics. I hope this (too brief) overview helps the reader in gaining perspective and in appreciating the varied and fascinating landscape of arguments and proposals in this debate

Usos de 'existir'

Màster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2022-2023, Director/Tutor: Manuel García CarpineroEste trabajo intentará clari car ciertas cuestiones acerca del status ontológico de lo que se conoce como objetos abstractos. Por un lado se suele aceptar que lo que existe es lo concreto, es decir, lo que está localizado espacio temporalmente, mientras que por otro lado, observando al menos nuestro uso del lenguaje convencional, parece que nos comprometemos con la existencia de entidades abstractas, como entidades de fi cción, o simplemente universales. Por ejemplo en lo que se denomina como discursos para ctivos y meta ctivos parece que se presupone la existencia de ciertas entidades de fi cción, cosa que también parece presuponerse en oraciones en las que los universales son los sujetos de una oración cualquiera (ver p. ej. [Inwagen(2003)], [Dorr(2008)] o [Lewis(1983)]). A su vez, el argumento de la indispensabilidad en matemáticas también pretende darle algún tipo de existencia a los objetos matemáticos [Shapiro(1997)], [(Ed.)(2007)], mientras que tanto éstos como el resto de objetos abstractos no parecen poder ser localizables espacio temporalmente. Así, el trabajo intentará especi car qué tipo de existencia se puede decir que tienen, haciendo énfasis en no confundir ideas por culpa de un mal uso del lenguaje. Por ello, se centrará en la clari cación del uso del término 'existir' (y similares, como 'hay'), justi cando la validez o no de sus usos. Para ello, y para centrar la discusión, se desarrollará un análisis crítico del artículo 'Existence, ontological commitment, and ctional entities' de Peter Van Inwagen ([Inwagen(2003)]). En base a las conclusiones se intentará mostrar hasta qué punto el debate es realmente sustantivo o si es una mera discusión entre formas de decir lo mismo. Se expondrán entonces argumentos que, al margen de cómo se expresen, pretenden ser aceptados por toda teoría sobre objetos abstractos

On metaphysics’ independence from truthmaking.

This paper aims to support the claim that analytic metaphysics should be more cautious regarding the constraints that truthmaking considerations impose on metaphysical theories. To this end, I reply to Briggs and Forbes (2017), whoargue that certain truthmaking commitments are incurred by a Humean metaphysics and by the Growing-Block theory. First, I argue that Humean Supervenience does not need to endorse a standard version of truthmaker maximalism. This undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion that Humean Supervenience and the Growing-Block theory are incompatible. Second, I argue that the Growing-Block theory does not commit us to any weaker version of truthmaker maximalism, which also undermines Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion. Finally, I point out other reasons to think that any version of truthmaker maximalism is disputable, undermining a fortiori Briggs and Forbes’s conclusion and supporting the moral that metaphysical theories—or at least Humean Supervenience, the Growing-Block theory, and presentism—are little constrained by truthmaking commitments

Typicality of Dynamics and Laws of Nature

Certain results, most famously in classical statistical mechanics and complex systems, but also in quantum mechanics and high-energy physics, yield a coarse-grained stable statistical pattern in the long run. The explanation of these results shares a common structure: the results hold for a 'typical' dynamics, that is, for most of the underlying dynamics. In this paper I argue that the structure of the explanation of these results might shed some light --a different light-- on philosophical debates on the laws of nature. In the explanation of such patterns, the specific form of the underlying dynamics is almost irrelevant. The conditions required, given a free state-space evolution, suffice to account for the coarse-grained lawful behaviour. An analysis of such conditions might thus provide a different account of how regular behaviour can occur. This paper focuses on drawing attention to this type of explanation, outlining it in the diverse areas of physics in which it appears, and discussing its limitations and significance in the tractable setting of classical statistical mechanics